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This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the sources of the ob-
served pattern that the levels and growth rates of technology are diﬀerent
across countries. The extended catching up model combined with the R&D
based endogenous growth model shows that the steady state technology gap
depends on both relative human capital investment and policy determinants
conducive to technology adoption. Supporting the theoretical ￿ndings, the
empirical analyses show that the technological catching up occurs, and that
as t r o n gs c a l ee ﬀect is found. Finally, the estimated speeds of TFP catching
up are around 2 percent.
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The neoclassical and endogenous growth models in Solow (1956), Romer
(1990), and Grossman and Helpman (1991) have emphasized the role of
technology as one of the sources of per capita income growth rate. How-
ever, assuming that technology grows at a constant rate across countries,
Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) show the conditional
convergence of real GDP per capita. Since the convergence in their mod-
els comes from the diminishing marginal product of capital, the role of the
technological factor might be overlooked.
As Bernard and Jones (1996a,b), Klenow and Rodriguez (1997), and
Hall and Jones (1999) show, there are important diﬀerences in technology
across countries. Based on the catching up theory, which is consistent with
the assumption of diﬀerent technology levels across countries, this paper
aims to ￿nd the sources of the observed pattern of technological catching
up. The catching up theory can be formalized by combining the relative
backwardness hypothesis and the adoption capacity.
The relative backwardness hypothesis introduced by Veblen (1915) and
Gerschenkron (1952) states that laggard countries are able to exploit a back-
log of existing technologies. Because adopting advanced technologies is eas-
ier and less costly than innovation, the backward countries attain a high pro-
ductivity growth rate at the same time that advanced countries have fewer
opportunities for high productivity growth. Thus, the technologically less
advanced countries tend to grow faster than technologically leading coun-
tries.
It is assumed that the advanced technologies invented in a leading coun-
try are available to any other country even without any trade in commodi-
ties. A necessary condition, in order that the laggard countries might be able
to take advantage of the available technology, is the well-developed capacity
to adopt the superior technology. ￿Adoption capacity￿, or the capacity to
adopt and implement advanced technologies, is determined by policy vari-
1ables that are conducive to technology adoption. The catching up theory
states that technological catching up is strongest in countries that are not
only technologically backward but also in those countries that have policy
determinants conducive to technology adoption.
The catching up theory, which is extended by including human capital
as an input, is combined with R&D based endogenous growth models such
as those of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpmen (1991) and Jones (1995).
It is shown that the steady state growth rate of technology is determined
by population growth rate while the steady state relative backwardness de-
pends on the adoption capacity, the productivity in the R&D sector, and
the relative human capital stock. Unlike Parente and Presscott (1994) and
Barro and Sala￿i￿Martin (1997), this paper formalizes the theoretical mod-
els of the catching up theory and implements empirical tests to support the
theoretical predictions.
The empirical relevance of the catching up theory is investigated by using
regression analyses. The empirical results support the formalized catching
up theory by showing the signi￿cant role that policy determinants conducive
to technological adoption play. The robust role of country size is also shown.
Further, the speeds of technological catching up are estimated to be around
2 percent. In contrast to Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992),
the empirical analyses propose to ￿nd the sources of the technological catch-
ing up rather than the growth rate of real GDP per capita under the as-
sumption that the levels of technology are diﬀerent across countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section
a simple catching up theory is formalized. Section 3 develops a general equi-
librium model by extending the simple catching up model and combining the
extended catching up theory with R&D based endogenous growth models.
In section 4, regression analyses are pursued to prove the empirical relevance
of the catching up theory, and where the speeds of technological catching
up and their standard errors are estimated. The policy implications of these
2m o d e l sa r et h e np r o p o s e di ns e c t i o n5 .
2F o r m a l i z i n g T h e C a t c h i n g U p T h e o r y
A simple model of technological catching up is formalized in this section.
Section 3 extends this model by including the human capital as an input
and then integrates it into R&D based endogenous growth models. A two
country model without trade in commodities is assumed throughout this
paper.
2.1 The Relative Backwardness and the Adoption Capacity
The relative backwardness hypothesis states that the greater the relative
backwardness, the faster the rate will be at which countries can catch up
with the technology level of the leading country through the adoption of
advanced technologies invented in advanced countries. This implies that the
countries having the same degree of relative backwardness at the initial time
period should grow at the same rate. This hypothesis alone does not seem to
be realistic. Even if several countries have the same initial technology level,
some can grow faster than others. This fact is shown by the rapid growth
in East Asian countries and the slow growth in several Latin American
countries, even if they had almost the same level of real GDP per worker in
the 1960s. Thus, highly backward countries cannot automatically catch up
with the technological level of the advanced countries. This implies that a
high degree of backlog is not a suﬃcient but only a necessary condition for
catching up.
In order for any technology adoption to be operational, a laggard country
must have a well-developed adoption capacity. This implies that even if two
diﬀerent laggard countries have the same degree of relative backwardness,
the actual technological catching up will depend on their respective adoption
capacity, which is, in turn, determined by policy factors. Economic policies
3such as the distortion of the foreign exchange markets, ￿nancial development
index, etc. aﬀect this adoption capacity. The other factors such as income
distribution, openness and human capital are also included as explanatory
variables.
In combining the relative backwardness and adoption capacity, the catch-
ing up theory implies that a country0s potential for growth is strong. How-
ever, it does not imply that a country is relatively backward in all respects,
rather that it is technically backward but has policies conducive to technol-
ogy adoption.
This process of adopting and implementing advanced technologies is de-
scribed by many papers using diﬀerent terminologies. These are ￿social
capability￿ (Abramovitz, 1986), ￿monopoly barriers￿ (Parent and Prescott,
1994), ￿imitation costs￿ (Barro and Sala￿i￿Martin, 1997), and ￿social in-
frastructure￿ (Hall and Jones, 1999). This paper uses the more neutral
￿adoption capacity￿ that is approximated by policy determinants conducive
to technology adoption because the empirical analyses include policy vari-
ables as an approximation of adoption capacity.
2.2 A Simple Model of Technological Catching Up
Assume that the technological leader has a higher level of technology than
that of the laggard countries at the initial time, and that all innovations
occur only in the leading country, and can be adopted by the laggard coun-
tries.





where AN is the level of technology in a leading country N.1
1Here and in subsequent notations, ˙ x denotes the time derivative of the variable x.
4The advanced technologies innovated in the leading country are available
to any country world wide even without a trade in commodities. So a unique
R&D project in the leading country contributes to the understanding of the
scienti￿c principles in all countries. However, the implementation of diﬀused
advanced technologies depends on the characteristics of each country. Two
steps are considered in this simple model: the degree of the diﬀusion of
the advanced technologies, and the degree of implementation of the diﬀused
technologies.
First, assume that the technology level of the laggard country, AS, over-
laps with the level of AN;i no t h e rw o r d s ,AS is a subset of AN. Thus, the
level of new technologies available to the backward countries is AN − AS.
Then assume that the degree of technology diﬀusion is related to the ra-
tio of this available level to the existing technology level of the laggard




AS ≡ GS − 1, and GS ≡ AN
AS , which implies the relative backwardness
hypothesis.
Second, the degree of implementation of the diﬀused technologies de-
pends on the adoption capacity, ΘS, of the laggard countries that is diﬀerent
across countries. As discussed above, ΘS depends on policies conducive to
the technology adoption.
Combining the degree of technology diﬀusion with the degree of imple-
m e n t a t i o no fd i ﬀused technologies, the technology adoption function of the











I no r d e rt oa s s u r eap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of the technology gap, η > 0 is assumed.3
2In the next section, the level of technology is de￿ned as the number of intermediate
goods used in production. Thus, the technology gap represents the diﬀerence in the
number of intermediate goods of two countries.
3Eaton and Kortum (1996) suggest the technology diﬀusion process under stochastic
model.
5Equation (2) formalizes the catching up theory that the realized eﬀect
of technology adoption depends on relative backwardness as well as on the
adoption capacity. The rate of technical progress in the laggard country is
positively related to the level of adoption capacity as well as to the degree
of relative backwardness.
Since relative backwardness is de￿ned as the technology gap between the
leading and laggard countries, GS(t), then using (1) and (2) the time path








g = gN = gS because the steady state growth rates of technology for the
two countries are the same, where gN and gS a r et h es t e a d ys t a t eg r o w t h
rates of technology of the leading and laggard countries, respectively. Using
(3) and ΘS, since this is constant in the steady state, the steady state level











S is the steady state value of adoption capacity.
The result implies that the higher adoption capacity of the laggard coun-
try causes the technology gap to decrease in the steady state. Equations (3)
and (4) result in the following three remarks.
Remark 1 (Convergence) Suppose that the laggard countries have diﬀer-
ent levels of adoption capacities. They converge to their own steady state






η , depending on their respective adop-
tion capacities.
Remark 2 (Technological Catching Up and Underdevelopment)S u p -
pose that the laggard countries have the same initial levels of technology gap
4T h ed e g r e eo fr e l a t i v eb a c k w a r d n e s sa n dt h et e c h n o l o g yg a pa r eu s e di n t e r c h a n g e a b l y
throughout this paper.
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Figure 1: A Simple Catching Up Model
but diﬀerent levels of adoption capacity. For a constant level of adoption
capacity, ΘS,c o u n t r i e s 0 growth rates along the transition path and steady
state levels of technology gap, GS, will be ranked by ΘS.
Remark 3 (Economic Policy Implication)I fac o u n t r yc a u g h ti na n
underdeveloped position can increase its adoption capacity through economic
policies, then this country might move from underdeveloped to the catching
up position. Conversely, if a country in the catching up process has a de-
crease in the level of adoption capacity due to policy failure, then this country
might move from the catching up to the underdeveloped position.
For example, in Figure 1 (with η =1 ) ,E 1,E 2, and E3 are the steady
state values of the technology gap. Assuming that G0 is the initial technol-
ogy gap, the countries, with the adoption capacities Θ1 and Θ2, are in the
catching up position, and the other country with Θ3 is in an underdeveloped
7position since the technology gap in E3 is wider than G0. If this country can
increase its adoption capacity from Θ3 to Θ1 or Θ2, it can move from the
underdeveloped to the catching up position.
What happens if two laggard countries start from diﬀerent technology
gaps? If their adoption capacities are the same, then the country that is
more highly backward will grow faster. However, in reality, these levels are
not the same. Even if one country is highly backward, it cannot grow rapidly
without the support of its adoption capacity. This means that the country
cannot realize and implement advanced technologies suﬃciently because of
its limited capacity to do so.
3 A General Equilibrium Model
The simple catching up model operates under the assumptions that the
technological progress of the leading country is given exogenously, and that
the technology adoption process of the laggard countries does not need any
resources. In this section, the simple model is extended by assuming that
the innovation and adoption processes need a resource.
All technological change is assumed to take the form of increases in
the range of intermediate inputs used in production. While new products
are produced through the investment of resources in the leading countries,
they are available to all laggard countries. Since the laggard countries have
diﬀerent capacities for the adoption and implementation of new technologies,
it is assumed that the real eﬀect of diﬀused technologies will depend on
the catching up theory previously discussed. As in the simple model, it is
assumed here that there is no trade in commodities.
The extended catching up model is combined with a R&D based endoge-
nous growth model as in those in Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman
(1991), and Jones (1995). The growth rate of technology and the level of
technology gap in the steady state are then derived.
83.1 Producer Behavior
3.1.1 The ￿nal goods sector
Assume that the production of ￿nal goods Y (t) uses human capital HY (t)
and a collection of intermediate capital inputs xj(t) at any point in time for







where A(t) is the variety of available intermediate capital inputs, and α is
a parameter between zero and one. While the production of ￿nal output
can employ any capital goods indexed by [0,∞), only the available goods,
[0,A(t)], at time t a r eu s e d . T h et e c h n o l o g yi n( 5 )c a nb ea c c e s s e db ya l l
agents in each country, and production occurs under a perfectly competitive




xj(t)dj = A(t)x(t). (6)
It is assumed that the number of workers, L, is homogenous within a
country, and that each unit of labor has been trained with Sh years of
schooling. Sh is determined by the constant fraction of time individuals
spend in accumulating skills:
HY (t)( ≡ hLY (t)) = eωShLY (t) (7)
where h stands for human capital per worker and LY is the labor force em-
ployed in ￿nal goods production. The exponential formulation is motivated
by the Mincer wage equation in empirical labor literature.6 It is straight-
forward to show that the parameter ω can be interpreted as the return to
5Subscript i = N and S is omitted without loss of generality .
6See Halls and Jones (1999) for details.
9schooling. Note that ω =0is a standard production function with unskilled
labor.
Normalizing the price of ￿nal output to 1, the demand for intermediate




j (t),j ∈ [0,A(t)] (8)
where pj(t) is the price of jth brand at time t.
The wage rate for human capital is:




3.1.2 The Intermediate Goods Sector
Assume that the intermediate goods sector is composed of an in￿nite number
of ￿rms on the interval [0,A(t)], and has purchased a design from the R&D
sector. All diﬀerentiated intermediate products are manufactured subject
to a common constant returns to scale under a monopolistic competitive
market structure at any moment of time. A ￿rm that has purchased a
design can then eﬀortlessly transform each unit of capital into a unit of
the intermediate input. It is assumed that capital is rented at rate r. A
unique supplier of jth variety who faces the demand function (8) maximizes
operating pro￿ts at time t.
max
xj(t)
πj(t)=pj(t)xj(t) − rj(t)xj(t) j ∈ [0,A(t)] (10)
Once a ￿rm in either region has mastered the technology for some products,
the goods can be manufactured with one unit of capital goods per unit of
output.
A ￿rm in the leading country that is uniquely able to produce some in-
novative goods faces competition only from other horizontally diﬀerentiated
brands. Such a monopoly ￿rm sees the downward sloping demand function






The monopolist realizes sales of xN(t) and earns operating pro￿ts per
unit of time, πN(t).
πN(t)=( 1− α)pN(t)xN(t) (12)
If a ￿rm in the laggard country adopts the advanced technology, then it
has monopoly power over this technology. Thus the ￿rm could charge its
monopoly price without fear of competition from other ￿rms in the same





πS(t)=( 1 − α)pS(t)xS(t). (14)
3.1.3 Innovation and Technology Adoption Function
It is assumed that the introduction of new products and the technology adop-
tion process need a resource. Here the resource is human capital. Based
on Jones (1995), the microfoundations for the innovation and technology
adoption function are technology transfer and externalities arising from du-
plications made in the R&D process.






where HAN(t) is the human capital employed in technology innovation and
φN is the productivity parameter in the innovation process. In this techno-
logical innovation function, ψ < 0 implies that the rate of innovation falls
with the accumulated level of technology; ψ > 0 corresponds to the positive
11eﬀect of the stock of technology that has already been discovered. ψ =0
represents technology innovation that is independent of the stock of accumu-
lated technology.7 In addition, 0 < ξ 5 1 is assumed, which implies that the
duplication of research might reduce the total number of new ideas produced
by HAN. The level of human capital employed in the innovation process is
de￿ned as hNLAN(t).h N and LAN(t) are human capital per worker and
labor force employed in R&D in the leading country, respectively.
As described in the simple catching up model, the incentive for the lag-
gard in adopting the advanced technology is that adoption is easier and less
costly than innovation. Combining the adoption capacity and the relative
backwardness hypothesis, the technological adoption process in the laggard






where ΘS re￿ects adoption capacity; G is the technology gap; and HAS(t) ≡
hSLAS(t) is the human capital employed in technology adoption, and hS is
the labor force eﬃciency rate LAS(t). Following the technology innovation
function of the leading country, ψ > 0 implies a positive eﬀect of accumu-
lated level of technology, and vice versa. Finally, resources in the leading
country are assumed to be more productive in undertaking innovation than
are resources in the laggard countries, φN > ΘS, and the growth rates of
the labor forces are ni for countries i = N and S.
3.1.4 Free Entry Conditions in the R&D Sector
An entrepreneur who devotes HAN(t) units of human capital in the research
sector for a time interval of length, dt, has the ability to produce new prod-




AN(t)dt. The total cost to produce new
products is wANHAN(t)dt. Assuming no barriers to entry in the R&D sector,
the free entry condition gives:






where wAN(t) i st h ew a g er a t eo ft h eh u m a nc a p i t a le m p l o y e di nt h eR & D
sector, and vAN(t)=
R ∞
t e−[r(τ)−r(t)]πN(τ)dτ represents the market value of
each blueprint.
The entrepreneurs in the laggard countries can enter freely into the ac-
tivity of technology adoption. They decide how many and which products to
adopt. Since all products yield identical pro￿ts by symmetry of the model,
the laggard countries are assumed to choose them randomly among the stock
of AN(t). These are products in the leading country that have not previously
been adopted. Using the same analysis as that used in the leader, the free






where vAS(t) is the value of a typical brand and wAS(t) is the wage rate
of human capital in the technology adoption sector. This relationship, like
(17), limits the value of a ￿rm to the cost of market entry.
3.1.5 The No-arbitrage Condition
The ￿rm in country i = N,S earns pro￿ts, πi(t)dt, for a product produced
during the length of time dt, and realizes a capital gain (or loss) of œ vAi(t)dt.
The no￿arbitrage condition implies that the total return on equity claims







3.1.6 The Factor Market Clearing Condition
While the human capital involved in the manufacturing sector of the ￿nal



















where HN(t) is the supply of human capital in the leading country. Since
human capital is de￿ned as hNLN(t), (20) is the same as LAN(t)+LYN(t)=
LN(t).










Suppose consumers share identical preferences and maximize utility over an
in￿nite horizon where the utility function has a constant intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution, 1
σ. The consumer0s intertemporal optimization prob-
lem for both of the countries is to maximize utility subject to intertemporal










s.t œ K(t)=r(t)K(t)+w(t)(1 − Sh)L(t)+Ał π − c(t)L(t) (23)
where ρ represents the subjective discount rate and c(t) is an index of con-
sumption per worker at time t. It is assumed that ρ is constant. Households
can borrow or lend freely at the instantaneous interest rate r(t),w (t) is the
wage rate, and K(t) is the total capital stock. Here Sh is the constant frac-
tion of time individuals spend in accumulating skills, and ł π is the monopoly
pro￿t in the intermediate goods sector.






(r(t) − ρ). (24)
3.3 Steady State Analysis
3.3.1 The Steady State Growth Rate
It is easily shown that the growth rate of output per capita and consumption
per capita in the steady state are equal to the growth rate of technology,
i.e., introduction of new goods at each time period. Since the growth rate of
researchers must be equal to the growth rate of the population in the steady
state, the steady state growth rate is:




where n is population growth rate and y is output per worker. The param-
eter, ψ, should be less than 1 to get a stable solution, implying a positive
growth rate in the steady state.8
The steady state growth rate is determined by the parameters for the
technology adoption (or innovation) function, ψ, and the growth rate of
researchers in technology adoption (or innovation), n,w h i c hi st h es a m ea s
the population growth rate. Thus, the growth rate in the steady state is
independent of the scale eﬀect as shown in Jones (1995). Next, the level of
the technology gap and the relative level of the ￿nal output per worker in
the steady state are derived.
3.3.2 The Steady State Technology Gap
First, combining (15) and (16), the steady state technology gap is:
8Since the steady state growth rate of technology gap is not zero if two population
growth rates are not the same, the steady state growth rates of technology will be gN =
ξnN
1−ψ and gS =
ξ(nNη+(1−ψ)nS)















This indicates that the steady state technology gap depends on the relative
steady state growth rate and human capital stock invested in the innovation




Substituting the demand for intermediate goods, (8), into the pro￿tf u n c -
tion, (12):






N(t) by symmetry of the model.
S i n c et h es t e a d ys t a t eg r o w t hr a t eo fc o n s u m p t i o np e rw o r k e ri sc o n -
stant by (25) and the parameters, σ and ρ, are assumed as constants, rN is




Since it is assumed that the population growth rate is constant, the
growth rate in the value of patent, vN(t), is constant by (19) and the fact














Since the wage rate in the ￿nal goods sector is the same as that in the








16Combining (15) or (16) and full employment condition, (20) or (21) with




αgi + ri(t) − ni
. (32)








HNgN (αgS + rS − nS)




Since the technology growth rates in the steady state and the interest
rates are the same across countries under the assumption of same population













Since ψ < 1 and η > 0, 1 − ψ + η is positive. The technology gap
in the steady state will depend on relative human capital stock, adoption
capacity of the laggard countries, and the productivity parameter for the
R&D sector in the leading country. Given the level of adoption capacity,
the countries that have a higher level of human capital stock have a higher
level of technology, implying a decrease in the steady state technology gap.
The steady state technology gap gives the general equilibrium version
of the simple catching up model in section 2, and the remarks made in
the simple model remain valid in this general equilibrium model setup as
well. First, the laggard country cannot reach the technology level of the
leading country unless it has a high adoption capacity or a large human
capital stock. Thus, countries with small human capital should increase their
adoption capacity. Second, a government can increase the technology level
by improving adoption capacity through policies conducive to technology
adoption.
In addition, the symmetric aggregate production function and the de-
















Substituting the steady state value of the technology gap, (34), the fol-













HNgN (αgS + rS − nS)




T h er e l a t i v eo u t p u tp e rw o r k e ri sa ﬀected by relative population growth
rate, relative steady state growth rate and relative human capital stock.
As Jones (1999) summarizes, this result holds for other endogenous growth
models if the steady state technology stock depends on the human capital
stock invested in the technology progress.



















Given the adoption capacity and a high human capital per worker, a
larger labor force leads to a higher GDP per worker. While a larger la-
b o rf o r c ec a ni n c r e a s et h eo u t p u tp e rw o r k e rg i v e nt h eh u m a nc a p i t a lp e r
worker, its increase with the support of the adoption capacity makes this
increase of the real GDP per worker more eﬀective. China and India, which
have large labor forces, are not guaranteed to have high levels of GDP per
worker because a larger labor force is not the same as a high level of human
capital, which is the input for producing ￿nal goods and adopting advanced
technologies. Thus, even if the relative output per worker depends on the
relative labor force between two countries, the level of adoption capacity and
18the eﬃciency of human capital should be supported to get higher output per
worker as well.9
4 The Empirical Tests
Based on the catching up theories described in sections 2 and 3, this section
analyzes the association between the growth rate of TFP and the factors
that aﬀect the level of adoption capacity by using regression analyses. The
approximate speeds of technological catching up and their standard errors
are also derived.
4.1 Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
Substituting (6) and (7) into the production function, (5), the Cobb￿Douglas
form of the production function with respect to physical and human capital
is derived.
Yi(t)=Ki(t)α(Ai(t)Hi(t))1−α (38)
After equation (38) is divided by labor force, the levels and growth rates
of TFP are derived. Following Psacharopoulos (1994) and Hall and Jones
(1999), the estimates of the rates of the return to schooling are used. For the
￿rst 4 years of education, the rate of return is 13.4 percent, and for the next
4 years and beyond 8 years, these are 10.1 and 6.8 percent, respectively. The
data for real GDP per worker and the labor force are from Heston￿Summer
Mark 5.6. Sh is assumed as the average years of secondary schooling, which
is from Barro￿Lee (1996). Capital stock is derived by using the perpetual
inventory method. The initial value of the 1960 capital stock is derived by
I60
g+δ where I60 is the investment rate in 1960 and g is the average growth
9While the theoretical models assume that human capital per worker, h, is constant
across countries, this is relaxed in empirical tests with the eﬃciency of the average years
of secondary schooling.
19rate from 1960 to 1970 of the investment series. The depreciation rate, δ,i s




S(t) be the steady-state level of the technology gap given by (4) in the
simple catching up model and (34) in the general equilibrium model, and
let GS(t) be the actual value of the technology gap between the leading and
the laggard countries.
First, the technology adoption function, (16), is approximated by using a
log linearization with a ￿rst order Taylor series expansion around the steady
state value of the technology gap.
dlnAS(t)
dt
∼ = g + ηg[lnGS(t) − lnG∗




where g is the steady state growth rate of TFP.




∼ = g +( ψ − 1)g(lnAN − lnA∗
N)+g[lnHAN(t) − lnH∗
AN]. (40)






∼ = − λ[lnGS(t) − lnG∗




where λ ≡ (1 − ψ + η)g. Since the growth rate and the technology level of
the leading country are constant through the equation, λ is the speed of
20technological catching up of the laggard countries. This shows how rapidly
the actual technology gap between the leading and the laggard countries


































Using the total human capital stock instead of the human capital stock
employed in technology innovation and adoption process, the integration
leads to the following regression equation.10
lnAS(T) − lnAS(0)
T









S + ξS (43)
where all variables for the leading country are constant, and β = 1−e−λT
T ,
and ξS is a residual of regression.
Since the relative backwardness in the steady state, (34), is a negative
function of the adoption capacity and human capital of the laggard country,
and assuming that the level of adoption capacity is determined by the factors
listed in the next subsection, the following regression equation is used.




S (0) + γ lnLS(0) + ξS
(44)
where Gtfp7089S and GS(0) imply the growth rate of TFP from 1970 to
1989 and the technology gap in 1970 of country S, respectively, and Bm
S (0)
10The derivation is available on request.
21re￿ects the mth determinant of the adoption capacity of country S in 1970.
Population as one of the independent variables is based on the production
function (38) and the technology adoption function of the laggard countries
(16), and γ re￿ects
gβ
λ . Here the regression equations divide human capital
stock into population size, LS, and human capital per worker, hS, following
equation (7). The technology gap is de￿ned as TFP gap where the United
States is the leading country.11
4.2.2 Data
Policy variables and the income distribution index are used as approximate
indicators of adoption capacity.12 Due to a lack of data availability, only a
limited number of variables are used.
First, the variable chosen to represent human capital is the average years
of secondary schooling. These data come from Barro and Lee (1996).13
Second, the black market premium (BMP) has been used as a measure
of exchange control or government trade policy. This measure re￿ects the
degree of the distortion of the foreign exchange market. In this analysis the
data available for use, which comes from Collins and Bosworth (1996) are
the average values from 1970 to 1980.
Third, two openness indices have been used. It is assumed that these
indices re￿ect the openness to foreign competition. The ￿rst index is de￿ned
as the average value of the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP
in current international prices from 1960 to 1969 (Penn World Tables 5.6).
This is denoted as Openness as in the regression results. For the second
one, the Sachs and Warner (1996) index (Openness SW) in 1970 is used
11It can be assumed that the leading country is G7 or a group of developed countries
which are on the frontier of some technologies.
12The eﬀect of economic policies on economic growth is discussed in Abramovitz (1995),
Abramovitz and David (1996), Collins and Bosworth (1996), and Jones (1998b).
13Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) argue that human capital contributes to productivity
by facilitating the adoption and implementation of new technologies rather than causing
economic growth directly.
22as an alternative proxy for the degree of openness. This proxy is de￿ned
as a dummy variable: 1 for open economies and 0 if a country is closed.14
Because the Sachs-Warner openness index includes BMP by de￿nition, this
variable is excluded in the regressions.
Fourth, the ratio of gross claims on the private sector by central and
deposit banks to GDP is used to represent the domestic ￿nancial status.
This factor re￿ects the overall size of the public sector including the degree of
public sector borrowing, thus, implying a broad array of ￿nancial indicators.
The index used is from King and Levine (1993) and denoted as Finance in the
regressions. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) found a positive relationship
between ￿nancial development and economic growth, and King and Levine
(1993), and Levine and Zervos (1998) show that the ￿nancial systems are
both positively and robustly correlated with productivity growth and capital
accumulation, as well as, economic growth.
Fifth, the Gini coeﬃcient is included as an approximation of income
inequality in the society. These data come from Deininger and Squire (1996).
Income inequality may be harmful to economic growth because the concerns
a b o u ts o c i a la n dp o l i t i c a lc o n ￿ict are more likely to lead to government
policies that hinder growth.
Lastly, in order to test the scale eﬀects on the technological adoption
process, the population size used is from the Penn World Tables 5.6.
The mean and variance of the dependent and independent variables are
summarized in Table 1. All variables except the TFP growth rate and human
capital are in log form and BMP is de￿n e da st h el o go f( 1 +b l a c km a r k e t
premium).
14It is equal to 0 if a country scored a 1 on either the BMP, the SOC (dummy variable
equals 1 if the country was classi￿ed as socialist), the EXM variable (dummy variable
equals 1 if a country had a score of 4 on the export marketing index), or the OWQID
(dummy variable equals 1 if OWQI>0.4). OWQI indicates coverage of quotas on imports
of intermediate and capital goods.







0.0016 0.0142 - 0.0421 0.0235
TFP
gap
0.6850 0.4401 - 0.2429 1.8290
Openness - 0.8870 0.6080 - 2.3230 0.9761
Human 0.4580 0.1840 0.0042 0.8181
BMP 0.1511 0.2771 0.0000 1.6730
Finance - 1.7770 0.8023 - 4.8940 0.0276
Gini - 0.9081 0.2479 - 1.3820 - 0.3567
Population 9.1760 1.4418 5.4760 13.2100
4.2.3 The Regression Results
All regression coeﬃcients are estimated by OLS and the results are reported
in Table 2. Data availability reduces the sample size to 67 in the ￿rst two
m o d e l sa n d6 6i no t h e rm o d e l s . 15 The empirical results strongly support the
catching up theory. The technology gap, which is conditional on the factors
of adoption capacity, is signi￿cantly correlated with the TFP growth rate.
Furthermore, the robust role of country size is found.
As i m p l er e l a t i o nb e t w e e nT F Pg r o w t hr a t ea n dt h ed e g r e eo fr e l a t i v e
backwardness is ￿rst estimated.16 The technology gap is not signi￿cant
and R2 is almost zero, suggesting the rejection of an absolute technological
catching up. Thus, the relative backwardness alone is not suﬃcient to catch
up with the technology of the leading country. The correlation between the
15Collins and Bosworth (1996) show the contribution of TFP growth through growth
accounting for East Asia and test the association between growth of output per worker
(and capital accumulation and TFP growth) and macroeconomic policy variables.















































Figure 2: Growth Rate and Gap of TFP (70-89)
TFP growth rate and the degree of relative backwardness is shown in Figure
2 with the regression line. Thus, the respective adoption capacity should be
considered.
Models (I) and (II) show the eﬀect of the degree of openness, human
capital, gini coeﬃcient, ￿nancial development and the country size on the
TFP growth rate. The ￿rst openness variable is not signi￿cant. Openness
is interpreted as the factor which promotes technology transfer even if the
general equilibrium model of this paper ignores the trade in commodities.
However, this result should be interpreted carefully. The openness might not
re￿ect the complete ￿ow of new ideas or technology through trade because
this de￿nition includes all kinds of trade, for example, agricultural goods
that are not sensitive to technological transfer.
The empirical results produced by using a diﬀerent openness index, i.e.,
25Sachs-Warner index, are presented in Models (III) and (IV). Openness is
signi￿cant in the speci￿cations. However, the results might come from dif-
ferent interpretations of openness. The de￿nition of this index takes into
account the black market premium and quota index. Thus, the implication
is diﬀerent from the openness index in the Penn data that considers the
simple average ratio of the exports and imports to GDP.
Model (II) shows the eﬀect of the black market premium. As it was
i n t e r p r e t e di np r e v i o u ss e c t i o n ,B M Pi st h ed e g r e eo fd i s t o r t i o no ft h ef o r e i g n
exchange market. This variable plays a signi￿cant role in explaining the
TFP growth rate, which implies that the foreign exchange market should
be included in explaining the technological adoption process. Since the
black market premium is considered as one of determinants of the Sachs
and Warner openness index, this is excluded in regressions (III) and (IV).
The eﬀect of the domestic ￿nancial development is found in models (I),
(II), and (IV). While the ￿rst two models show the robust correlation be-
tween the ￿nancial system and TFP growth rates, the other model does
not.17
All models include the gini coeﬃcient as an equity factor and human
capital variable. The human capital is signi￿cant in all models, the same
as the results in the empirical growth models of Barro (1991), and Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) etc. Except in the second model, the role of income
distribution is not signi￿cant. The second model shows that the explanatory
p o w e ro ft h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient is almost the same as that of the initial gap.18
Income distribution is known as a trade oﬀ with economic growth. How-
17Even with a diﬀerent de￿nition of ￿nancial development (the ratio of the liquid liabil-
ities of a ￿nancial system to GDP from King and Levine), the regression results are the
same.
18Recent empirical works tend to support a negative relationship, that the greater a
society
0s income inequality is the slower its growth. Perrson and Guido (1994) ￿nd a
strong negative relationship between income inequality and growth in GDP per head.
Furthermore, Perotti (1996) supports these predictions through diverse channels such as
fertility, investment in education, ￿scal policy, and sociopolitical instability.
26ever, these empirical results suggest more research is needed on the relation
between equity factor and TFP growth rates.
Surprisingly, we found that the role of population is signi￿cant. All
regression coeﬃcients on the level of population are strongly signi￿cant at
the 5% signi￿cance level. Supporting the de￿nition of the technological
adoption function in the theoretical framework, the results suggest that
the human capital investment in the R&D sector plays a signi￿cant role in
increasing the implementation and adoption of advanced technologies.
4.2.4 The Robustness of Scale Eﬀects
Table 3 reports the results of robustness tests of scale eﬀect. The second
model speci￿cation of Table 2 is used as the base because this includes all
possible combinations of the independent variables used in the empirical
tests. The other speci￿cations do not aﬀect the results of robustness tests
as well.
Before we go over the regression tests, the TFP level and growth rate are
compared with Klenow and Rodrigues-Clare (1997). To get the correlation
for the same year, the TFP level at 1985 is derived as well by using the same
method in paper. The correlation coeﬃcient between the two TFP levels at
1985 is 0.96. For the two growth rates, while their given growth rates cover
the years 1960 to 1985, this paper covers 1970 to 1985. The correlation
coeﬃcient of the two growth rates is 0.87.
Going over the regression results, the White heteroskedastic-consistent
estimate, which tests the inconsistency of the estimated coeﬃcients, is re-
ported. This estimation computes standard errors that are consistent even
in the presence of unknown heteroskedasticity. The estimated coeﬃcient
does not aﬀect the signi￿cant role of population.
Speci￿cation B tests the eﬀects of outliers. The outliers are identi￿ed
through residual plots, Cook￿s distance, and partial regression plots for pop-
ulation. Even after the outliers (Uganda, Guyana and Iran) are removed,
27the coeﬃcient on the population is 0.0039 which is not much diﬀerent from
the results in the original models.
Third, to consider the sample selection bias, diﬀerent sample sizes are
used by removing independent variables having a small sample. Here the
number of the maximum sample is 91 excluding Gini coeﬃcient, BMP and
￿nancial development. However, it does not aﬀect the explanatory power of
the population either.
Next, the two model speci￿cations take account of the missing variable
bias problem. Except for the determinants in the main empirical speci￿-
cations, several variables are then selected. These are the distance from
the equator and the fraction of population speaking English as a mother
tongue, which might re￿ect the eﬀect of Western European expansion in
World history.
Speci￿cation D includes the distance from the equator as another in-
dependent variable which is measured as the absolute value of latitude in
degrees divided by 90 as in Hall and Jones (1999). It is widely known that
economies further from the equator are more successful. In addition, speci-
￿cation E includes the fraction of population speaking English as a mother
tongue, and the distance from the equator. This re￿ects that familiarity
with English might in￿uence the process of technology transfer. These two
diﬀerent speci￿cations show that there is little change in the coeﬃcient of
the country size. The data of latitude and language are from Hall and Jones
(1999).
Finally, by including the population size as one of the independent vari-
ables, two diﬀerent model speci￿cations as in Barro (1991) and Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992) are estimated, even if the dependent variable is
the growth rate of income per capita. The coeﬃcient on population level is
not guaranteed to be signi￿cant, re￿ecting that the eﬀe c to fp o p u l a t i o no n
economic growth is an unresolved problem and suggests more work in the
future. For Mankiw, Romer and Weil, the population growth rate and level
28are not signi￿cant at the 5% signi￿cance level. However, the model speci￿-
cations without human capital show the more signi￿cant role of population
than that of population growth rate. For Barro speci￿cations, the results
are sensitive to the combinations of independent variables. It is concluded
that while the regression with the government expenditure share to GDP as
one of the independent variables does not show the role of population to be
signi￿cant, those with an investment share to GDP do show a strong role.
As several robustness tests show above, the eﬀect of the population level
might be sensitive to the model speci￿cations and more research on the role
of country size is suggested.
4.2.5 The Speeds of Technological Catching Up
The speed of technological catching up, λ, in equation (41) shows how
rapidly the TFP gap approaches its steady state value. The value of speed
is derived by using the coeﬃcient on the initial technology gap of regression
equation (44) since β = 1−e−λT
T in equation (43). In addition to the speeds
of technological catching up, their standard errors are derived by assuming
that the coeﬃcients for the initial technology gap follow normal distribution,
with mean, ￿ β, and variances, σ2




1 − ￿ βT
(β − ￿ β). (45)
Since ￿ β is a coeﬃcient for the initial technology gap and T is 19, λ







the regression results in Table 2, the speeds of TFP catching up and their
standard errors are reported in Table 4.
The speeds of TFP catching up are from 1.7 to 2.4 percent, which imply
similar speeds to those for GDP per capita derived by Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992). Finally, assuming around 2% speed of TFP catching up, the
economy moves halfway to a steady state in about 35 years.
295C o n c l u s i o n
Based on the recent empirical ￿ndings that the technology levels and growth
rates are diﬀerent across countries, this paper suggests the simple and ex-
tended catching up models. These models show how the innovation in the
leading countries are adopted by the laggard countries. Combining the ex-
tended catching up model with the R&D based endogenous growth models,
the theoretical model demonstrates that even if the steady state growth
rates of the technology of two countries are independent of the scale eﬀect,
the steady state relative backwardness depends on the level of adoption ca-
pacity, the productivity of the R&D sector, and the relative human capital
stock.
Supporting the predictions from the models, the empirical results show
that the technology catching up occurs even without the diminishing marginal
productivity of capital. Since TFP is one component of real GDP per worker,
the extended version of the catching up theory suggests that the channel of
TFP catching up might constitute one of the major forces for the conditional
convergence process of real GDP per worker.
It is shown that the policies for building adoption capacity are very
important. These policies include human capital, ￿nancial development,
exchange rate policy and so on. If the government succeeds in improving
adoption capacity, it might escape underdevelopment and move into the
catching up process. If the level of adoption capacity falls because of policy
failure, a country even in the catching up process might slide back to the
state of underdevelopment.
Contrary to the recent empirical results that reject the role of population,
the robust role of country size is found. In order to test the robustness of the
empirical results, several tests are taken. They are regressions with diﬀerent
combinations of independent variables as well as without outliers identi￿ed
by diagnostic plots and partial regressions. Thus, the possible problems
of sample selection bias, and outliers do not aﬀect the main conclusions
30of this paper. The comparisons with the results of the recent empirical
speci￿cations, however, show that the robust role of population in growth
rate of real GDP per capita cannot be strongly accepted. With these results,
this paper concludes that the scale eﬀect is an unresolved problem and more
work on this should be done in the future.
The estimated speed of technological catching up is around 2%, implying
that the actual technology gap moves halfway to the steady state technol-
ogy gap in about 35 years. Finally, the general equilibrium model does not
allow trade in commodities. Since trade in commodities is one of the im-
portant channels for transferring advanced technologies, this factor needs
to considered in future research. Furthermore, the factors aﬀecting adop-
tion capacity include institutional factors in addition to human capital and
policy variables. Hence, these indicators should also be considered as well.
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35Table 2. TFP Growth Rates and Policy Determinants
I II III IV
constant
-
-0 . 0 5 4 8
(- 4.1951)
-0 . 0 5 6 3
(- 4.4647)
-0 . 0 5 4 3
(- 4.9237)
















































-0 . 0 1 0 8
(- 1.8480)
-0 . 0 1 3 6
(- 2.3593)
-0 . 0 0 3 6
(- 0.6101)












R2 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.53
sample 67 67 66 66
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.




































-0 . 0 0 6 0
(- 1.2155)
0.50
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.







Model I 0.0170 0.0039 0.0205 0.0058
Model II 0.0193 0.0039 0.0240 0.0062
Model III 0.0146 0.0035 0.0171 0.0048
Model IV 0.0167 0.0036 0.0201 0.0053
37